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Determining the Consumption Effects
of Announced Permanent and Temporary Tax Cuts
in Accordance with The Permanent Income Hypothesis

Ferbruary 24 , 1 984

Aileen Liu
Econ 501 Honors Thesis

INTRODUCTION

(

For several years, economists have been debating how well Federal
tax policy changes have performed in readjusting the economy. Tax change
policies have been instituted periodically since World War II up to the
very present. The goals sought by the legislators have varied.

The tax

cut policy in the Kennedy administration was set up to invigorate a recessionary economy. Under the Reagan administration, tax cuts are a tool
to increase savings and investment. Part of the reason for the inc onsistency in policy aims is due to the lack of consensus on how a tax cut
will perform in a given period .

Most predictive models ignore the state of

the economy at the time, the degree of consumer optimism, and lags in the
adjustment of consumer expectations .

These variables are vital in

determining the consumers' reactions to a given tax cut during a given
economic phase .

Moreover, whether consumers can even distinguish the

windfalls from a tax cut apart from increases in take home pay from a wage
hike, is a matter of debate.
Recent discussions have been focused on the temporal nature of the
tax cuts. The significance of the issue seems real enough such that cuts
are determined and categorized according to their permanent or transitory
nature of< Consumer spending after a tax reduction that is permanent or one
that is temporary (either a one-shot rebate or a cut specified to last for
one_ or two years) , can be measured to see whether each has a distinctive
effect on consumer spending. The widely accepted r~rmanent Inco~e Hypothesis
(PIH) states that transitory changes have their main impact on saving and
not on consumption. Permanent Income on which consumer spending is based; is
a ,veighted average of consumers ' past incomes,

for

consumption patterns

take time to readjust to increments in today·s income .

Given this view, a

.. I vlouid like to thank Jarvis Babcock, Luis Fernandez , and James Zinser
for their helpful suggestions on how to address this topic .

•
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temp~rary

tax cut will barely have an effect on permanent income , since the

change is known to be temporary. Consumption will then proceed in the same
direction as if there had been no tax change at all .
that a rise in income stimulates consumer spending.

Macroeconomists argue
A tax cut is easily

associated with the growth of consumer spending, if one agrees with the
premise that consumers have treated the increase in take-horne pay from the
tax cut in the same way they treat increases in their take-home pay from
other sources (Okun, 1971). Given the supposition that consumers plan their
spending patterns over a horizon, the consumers would calculate a larger
spending increase today, knowing that they will attain the same tax cut
in each future period.
There are challenges to the permanent income theory and additional
qualifications to be made about the effect of a tax cut:
First, consumers do not necessarily make temporary/permanent income
distinctions for each change in government policy which affects their
income .

This is especially true if the change is of uncertain duration

and is of a trivial amount relative to their level of income.

Thus, con-

sumers may be either too myopic or may not want to incur the cost of including
a temporary tax change into their consumption horizon.
Second, consumption measured by the flow of services, may lead to a
different consumption effect than consumption based on consumer spendin<;J.
In practice, consumption is defined as consumer expenditures of nondurables
and services plus an estimate on the imputed flow of services from the
existing stock of durable goods.

Saved temporary tax cuts may very likely

take the form of investment in consumer durables .

In such a case , a temporary

tax cut may actually stimulate consumer spending by a substantial amount .

3.

The PIH is a theoretical relationship between income and consumption.

More

specifically, the dependent variable should be consumption as estimated by
expenditures less durab1es.

Net investment in consumer durab1es is a component

of spending, but is not a part of consumption.
A third qualification concerns the size- of any windfall .

A number of

economists feel that there is a significant difference between the effect
of 'big' versus ' little' windfalls on consumption with the larger windfalls
being treated in a way compatible with the PIH.
thus hypothesised to be
permanent income.

saved

The smaller tax cuts, are

by consumers, and do not affect a consumer's

According to empirical evidence, large windfalls will have

a significant effect on consumption whereas small windfalls will n ot effectively
change either permanent income or consumption (Juster, 1977 ).
Other miscellaneous qualifications inclUde:
strained by liquidity

consumers

who . are con-

and may react strongly to even temporary tax changes ;

consumer skepticism, whereby consumers may not always believe the announced
duration of a tax cut;

lastly,

tp~

rational

shorter than the PIH creators envision.

- spending horizon may in fact be

If so, the temporary changes may

have a more substantial effect on consumption than theory predicts .

4.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The first true empirical study of consumer responses to tax cuts was
undertaken by Arthur Okun (1 971) while he was on the staff of Presidential
Economi c Advisers.

He revealed the effectiveness of the 1968 surtax in con-

tracting a 'runaway' economy.

Okun established that temporary tax changes

were equally effective as any permanent tax changes had been. Consumer
spending estimates were drawn from disaggregated consumption functions.
His methodology in testing the efficacy of the surtax policy was to choose
the better of two consumption

simul~tion

effect hypothesis were formulated.

models: a full effect and a zero

In the case of the full effect, deductions

from personal disposable income due to a surcharge are treated like any other
change in disposable income.
~ould

At the other extreme, the zero <effect, a surtax

be wholly ignored by consumers and would be ineffective in curbing

consumer spending during an inflationary period.
Through a simulation proces s, Okun compared the, two sequences of consumpt i on forecasts to the real world outcome in order to establish which model
came closer to the actual spending patterns .

Okun was able to confidently

conclude that a surtax had a full effect on nondurables.

The standard error

for the full effect model was slightly lower in testing for durable goods .
Hmvever, the degree of improveme nt was not substantial.

Finally, beca1..lse the

aut o boom occurred during the 1968 period independent of the surtax, Okun
actua lly saw a positive relationship between the surtax and auto spending.
Spending on autos rose concomitantly

with the rise in taxation.

The fact

that spending could work independently of a tax policy raised the question of
how reliable a ny tax policy can be.

For economists, it necessitates formulating

a model which does not ignore the ramifications of whether the economy is

5.

undergoing a slump or is experiencing a period of prosperity.
Okun and his successors (Juster, Modigliani, and Steindel ) al l tested for
purely dichotomous, zero or one, differentials between a permanent and temporary
tax change and consumption .

Later studies beginning with Blinder would seek

to measure the impact of a temporary cut in relation to a permanent cut.
Thomas Juster (1977) applied a version of the Houthakker and Taylor saving
model (1966 ) to compare the effects of the 1968 surcharge and the 1 975 tax
cut on consumer expenditures . His tests were inappropriate for testing the PIH
i n its pure form, but were relevant for testing the differential effects of
tax changes on spending, which is the macro-policy question.

His results in-

dicated that consumers do not differentiate between declared or announced
permanent and temporary tax changes.

Consumption effects for both permanent

and temporary tax changes are spread through time, however Juster failed to
note whether consumers are quicker in adjusting to a permanent cut as opposed
to a transitory tax cut.
As a direct contrast to Okun' s work Steindel and Modigliani (1977)
concluded that a temporary tax cut has very little impact on consumption.
Most of the spending effect is nat felt until at least a year after the tax
cut

is implemented. _ THe Modigliani-Steindel (M-S) Model was structured on

the life-cycle hypothesis and was consistent with the PIR .

Through a best-

fit methodology, it was found that the 1975:2 rebate did not produce prompt
spending responSes, and was thus ineffective as a stimulus to consumption.
Unl ike the Juster study, the M-S Model did not distinguish among changes in
disposable income according to source.

Without disaggregating disposable

income, it was assumed thirt a tax rem te would affect consumption to the same
degree as any other changes in income values WOUld.

Three models, DRI,

',.

r.

~ -
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Michigan, and MPS were adapted along wi th the authors ' own model.

The

results of the study confirmed that the 1975 rebate did not induce consumer
spending until the fifth quarter.
of the study.

Juster questions,the'substantiality

He claims that the M-S equation underestimates the rise in

consumer demand in 1975-6 beeause it does not model "the reduced uncertainties faced by consumers during this period of recovery (Juster, 1977) ."
A close look at the consumer spending data for this period tends to
confirm that there was indeed a slowdown in consumer spending. Any effect
resulting from a tax cut would have been latent, as the M-S model predicts .
Consumers respond much the same to temporary and permanent tax changes
given the frequent occurence of the latter.

This is a claim made by Dolde

(1979), and empirically tested by Juster (1977).

Dolde focused on the issue

that aggregate tax change responses need not be identical to changes in other
incomes.

In previous work, Dolde (1976) found that consumption of nondurables

responded faster to tax changes than to other income changes.
he found that lags from tax liabilities last

For example,

approximately 1 . 2 quarters.

Other changes in income had a lag period of 2 . 2 quarters.

Dolde points out

that consumers learn about the permanence of a tax change by publicity, and
thus there is more rapid communication of tax changes than of other income
changes.

As a consequence, he expects

that consumers adjust their spending

patterns more rapidly after a tax change.

Moreover, because of the frequency

of tax changes, the rational . conilmer's response to temporary tax changesare
only slightly smaller than responses to non-tax changes which affect their income.

He cites the fact that the temporary tax changesof 1968 and 1975 were

only two of a dozen major federal tax changes since 1945.
Furthermore, there are indirect effects of unanticipated changes in
current income, otherwise, households wou1d be indifferent whether changes
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in income arise from labor, property, or tax cut income .

In the aggregate

he affirms that income type matters significantly and should be accounted for. He
hypothesizes that the marginal propensity to consume can differ radically for
consumers receiving income from different sources.

This hypothesis is in

contrast· to the view that most tax cuts are not 'perceived' by the consumer.
A reduction in withholding rates may increase one's take-home pay, however
one is often unable ta distinguish a tax cut gain from a rise in one's wage
rate or an adjustment for inflation.
For stabilization purposes, it is spending, not consumption which ie of
interest (Dolde, 1979, Blinder, 1979).

Dolde's dependent variable is the NIA's

consumption of non-durable goods and services.

He concludes that tax changes

have larger and more rapid consumption effects than do

n~tax

changes in income .

Dolde's main contributionto those attempting to forecast consumer responsed
to stabilization policies is to outline the limitation of such a study.

The

difficulties are mechanical, for on balance, estimated distributed lag consumption functions underestimate the speed and magnitude of the consumer's
response to . stabilization policies.
In a more recent study, Alan Blinder (1981), establishes a model which
has built in , a priori, the theory that income sources deemed to be more
permanent will elicit prompter/greater spending responses than inc
deemed to be more temporary.

sources

Blinder builds a non-linear consumption func-

tion, distinguishing temporary taxes from other income (factor income and
transfer payments).

Although Blinder's empirical results contain

unavoidably

large standard errors, he comes away with point estimates which weigh temporary tax changes as a 50% \veight of a normal, permanent tax change.

A

temporary tax change within a year is estimated to have only half the impact
on consumption of a permanent tax change of equal magnitude.

Based on one

quarter of data alone, he estimates that the 1975:2 rebate had only 38% the

8.

impact of a permanent tax cut . The estimated percentages are derived from the
ratio of the temporary tax change parameter over the permanent tax change
parameter.
Because Blinder was less interested in testing the PIH itself, he used
unfiltered consumer spending as a dependent variable rather than pure consumption.

He found the spending variable to be appropriate in a study which

focused on stabilization policy.

Thus, his parameters include the effects of

durables and non-durables .
Disposable income, a right hand side determinant is segregated into two
categories: regular and special windfall income.
from tax cuts are the topic of analysis.

Special windfalls arising

Very simply, his model includes a

coefficient which depends on both the quarter, t, and on the specific tax
under consideration.
each special tax.

Blinder uses a dummy variable to test the impact of

For Blinder, the special taxes include the 1968 surcharge

and the 1975-6 tax cuts.

Windfalls are defined as the disposable income gain

or loss in quarter, t, as the result of an unexpected tax change.
The structural model contains non-stock market and stock-market wealth,
and regular and special incomes as the main explanatory variables.

Blinder's

regression showed how the 1975-76 tax cuts contributed to the sudden drop of
the APe and its subsequent growth, plunging from .913 in 1975:1 to .881 in
1975:2, a .032 decline within a quarter.

The sudden drop corresponded to

the quarter in which the tax rebate was enac"ted.

The economy steadily pro-

gressed thereafter, culminating in an APe of .935 in -"1977: 1.

Estima-ed spending

coefficients showed the direct effects of tax cuts on spending.

The pattern

of spending from the tax cuts during the 1975:2-1976 period corresponded to the
erratic drop and subsequent rise in the APe.

Spending coefficients indicated

that a small proportion of the rebate was spent in 1976:2 ( 5.9 billion dollars ).
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An even smaller portion of the extra income arising from the tax cut was used
in the remainder of 1975, 4.3 billion dollars.

However, by 1976:2, $6 . 7 billion

-was spent and an average of $7.2 billion was consumer, thereafter.
An interesting hypothetical test was initiated, whereby the estimated
coefficients were applied.

It was shown that over a two year horizon the

1975-76 tax cut was 80% as effective as a permanent cut.

Simple

co~ectures

were drawn from the result that a temporary cut is half as effective as a
permanent cut over a four quarter period .

Since $20 billion was lost during

the five quarter tax cut/rebate package, a permanent tax cut about half as
large, $9.5 billion would achieve the same results in affecting aggregate
demand .

10.

POLICY AIMS AND OUTLINES
The three special taxes whi ch will be the focus of this study include
the Kennedy Revenue Act 1964:March -1965:2; the Reve nue Adjustment Act
1975:2 - 1976:2, and the 1981:4 - present Economic Recovery Act.

Using

quarterly time-series data from 1963 : 4 - 1 983:2, I will be working with
a sample size of 79 data points .
The Revenue Act prescribed during the Kennedy Administration was aimed
at the demand side of the economy.

Its purpose was to put productive capacity

to work by raising private demand.

The consumption gain is twofold :

1 ) There is a direct result on personal disposable income
2 ) Extra incomes arise from additions to consumer spending,
a multiplier effect.
In 1965, the economists did witness a buoyant state of demand . There
were large increases in spending, particularly for defense • . Reasons for
the change in economic climate were the rise in defense spendig and the 1964
reduction in personal and corporate income taxes, according to the 1 966
Sur vey of Current Business .
The 1975 antirecession cuts were part of a twofold tax package .

Beginning

in 1 975, the Revenue Adjus tment Act increased the minimum standard deduction,
increased the perce nt of standard deductions, and extended the 10% refundable
earned i ncome credit program for families with dependents and incomes below
$8,000 .

The Tax Reform Act in 1976, merely extended the provisions of the

Revenue Adjustment Act .

I n the second quarter of 1975, a tax rebate program

·was implemented
Reagan's recent Economic Recovery Act (1 981 ) reduces the marginal tax
r at e facing a median income family in 1984 from 28% to 22%.

His incentive

tax policy attempts to increase the after-tax returns for work, saving, and
investment - raising the supply level of the economy.

He focuses on a phased

I

."
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reduction schedule , in which individual tax rates are reduced in stages
by 30 percent.

This is the basic "10-10-10" tax cut. Compared with the

former tax law , rates would be reduced by 5 percent for 1981,15 percent for
1982, 25 percent for 1983 and 30 percent for 1984. The Reagan Economic

Recovery Act (ERA ) began in 1981:4 and should last through 1984 .

DURATION OF TAX POLICIES
The tax cut of 1974 was designed to accelerate the growth of a sluggish
economy.

As a marginal tax cut policy, it was expected to be of an indefinite

duration, and was legislated to be permanent .
In 1975 . a massive tax cut was enacted.
clearly temporary and the ensuing

The one-shot rebate package was

tax cuts were considered to be of a tem-

porary duration as well .

The most recent tax cut, the ERA,was legislated to be permanent and will
be ' on the books ' until it is repealed by a change in tax policy.

12 .

GENERAL THEORY AND DEVELOPME NT OF MODEL

By formulating a model which measures the impact of a permanent vis

a vis

a temporary tax cut, I am in essence asking whether a tax cut at the moment
it is announced to the public at large as a discretionary fiscal policy,
is able to induce consumers to increase their expenditures.

Such a model will

be outlmea beginning from a bask Keynesian framework and methodically expanded
i n order to incorporate t he Permanent Income Hypothesis , which differentiates
transitory and permanent changes in income.
My analysis will include various adaptations of the consumption function.
I n each case, I will hope to summarize my results with an analysis of the
theoretical implications of any changes I haVe made.
Keynes ' General Theory contained what he called "a fundamental psychological law."

Very simply, we may state that as income increases ,

consumpti on also increases but by a smaller degree .
C

= f(y)

O/~<l

A corollary of this law concerns the long run and short run consumption
habi·t s of the individual consume r.

In · the short run, one 's standard of

liv ing is not as flexible as in the long run .
i nc ome and 'usual' spending would be saved .

Differences between actual
Spending patterns are based on

habit formation and thus , a consumer would require time to adapt to changes
in income.
The most basic linear model makes no short or long run stipulations:
C = J... + /5Y + u.

The income variable is personal disposable income, for a

consumer has net income in mind when making consumption decisions .

Be-

cause consumption is assumed to be independent of the price level , t he
vari ables of the consumption function will be deflated by the GNP price
i ndex and entered in real, n ot nominal terms .

This process is also ne- '
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cessary to avoid overestimation of the correlation coefficients.
Consumers' spending

d~cisions

' normal' changes in their income.

will be affected by permanent, habitual,
Friedman (1957) defines permanent income

as an amount consumers believe they can consume given a set wealth level.
Such income is often described as: planned, normal, expected, or permanent
income .

The difference between observed current income and permanent income

is the transitory component, YT'
It is assumed that a consumer wi l l derive h is/her consumption schedule
with only Yp in mind .

The ratio of Cp/Y p is independent of Yp .

Our basic

consumption function is derived as follows, where consumption is a function
of Permanent Personal Disposable Income,

oP .
Permanent income is a weighted
average of past incomes.
Multiply each side by d......
Subtract DPt from both sides .

~

measures how quickly consumers adjust to changes in their current
disposable income . The larger l, the more quickly consumers adjust .

"V

~

,;,here : V~

The derivation"af the model took place
in discussions with Professor Fernandez .

estimating equation

14 .

When testing the outcome of a Federally legislated tax cut, one
cannot. conveniently assume that taxes stay constant in years where tax
laws have not been enacted, for taxes are not exogenous.

There is a steady

increase in tax levels corresponding to rises in income levels .
Permanent Personal Income will be denoted,
Disposable Income, DIP.

PI~

and Permanent Personal

Definitionally, disposable income is equivalent

to personal income less tax and nontax payments.

It may be helpful to

comment at this pOint on ideally using tax rates , r, rather than aggregate
tax levels in the estimating equation . The main problem in using aggregates is the possibility of including effects into the model other than the
specific marginal tax changes I am interested in capturing.

Other effects

would primarily be the res ult of a high degree of correlation between taxes
and ci.!!l80me .

According to the PIH , temporary tax changes will be • ignored ', \\hereas
a permanent tax change should induca an additional spending effect •
whe re r t P
rtP

...

=L oC kr t _ k oCrPt-l +
oC rP _ +
=
"
t l
.".

1( 0 0

~

rt

temporary or no rate change .

rt + B( rt- r t_l ) permanent
rate change .

To avoid non-linea r estimation, logs were applied .
In Ct

=a

+ b In Dt P + Ut

= -rtP

In DtP
In PItP

+ In PItP

=£ tZkln PIt_k =cL.ln PI t !?1 + In PIt

In Ct -,,[In Ct_l::: a(I-.,() + b(ln DtP - oCln Dt_lPJ + Vt
"In Ct :::
~Note that:

C.

-r t

+ .:Un Ct-l + b (-r t P + .{.rP~-1 + In PItP - In<tPIP t-l + Vt )

= -rtP

+ ~Pt-l

no permanent tax change

15.
In order to distinguish permanent t .a x changes from transitory cuts
and from 'no change ' a qualj_tative dummy variable is created;
DUM = 0

years when there is not tax cut, or the tax cut is temporary .

DUM= 1

years when the tax cut is permanent.

I.

In Ct = c +

~n

Ct _l + b In (P1t-rt) -

(B(rt-rt_l)}DUMt + Vt

In Ct = c + c;(ln Ct - l + b In Dl t - . ,(B(rt - rt-l ) ]DU~ + Vt
At its very extreme , as B approaches 1.0 , consumers would treat the tax
cut as a permanent change in income.

An announcement alone would induce

consumers to change their spending patterns .

.I f B approached zero, con-

sumers' spending patterns would be unaffected by the tax cut.
The specified equation has its theoretical basis in a model by
Brown (1952).

His major premise was that consumption is a function of

continuous past influences:

Ct

=~

+ BIYt + B2Ct_l

This construction of the consumption equation obeys the Keynesian requirement that short run MPC is less than long run MPC, where long run MPC,
MPCLR

= Bl/(l

- B2).

Theoretically, by introducing a lagged dependent vari-

able, one puts in an infinite distributed lag in income with geometrically
declining weights (Pindyck 1981).
00

Ct

= c(/I-B2
- .

+ Bl;ZB2jYt_' .
J:O

J

The consumption - disposable income relationship has appeared in all sizes,
degrees of disaggregation, and variations on the Keynesian law.

The presence

of lagged consumption, however, introduces a cumulative influence of the
whole history of consumption and of income on current ~onsurnption.

Habit

persistence, or what Heller calls "inertia in living standards" is implied
by the lagged consumption variable (1968).
Heller ran regression estimates for the period 1954 :1 - 1 964:4
Ct

= -1.40

+ .371 Yt + .609 Ct - l •
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One of the most important assumptions of the PIH is that transitory
components of income and of consumption are uncorrelated: cov (cT'

y"i') =

0,

for it is this assumption which is the basis for the hypothesis that a
windfall gain will be saved, and a positive YT value will not lead to a
deviation from one's consumpti on plan.
Statistically speakfugthe independence of the two transitory effects
can not be guaranteed.

The effect of the correlation between stastically

recorded transitory components of income and consumption is greatly dependent on how the . data was obtained.
be measured independently.

Ideally, income and consumption should

Onl y then might we expect the errors of the

estimate to be independent. Friedman (1957) cautions the researcher that
the consumption variable should not be estimated by substracting savings
from income.
For the purpose of

consumption-inc~me

analysis, consumption (per-

sonal consumer expenditures) data was taken from the U.S. Department of
Commerce, BEA.

The components of this series include the market value of

goods and services purchased by individuals and nonprofit institutions,
the financial services received in kind by individuals,and the estimated
rental value of owner-occupied homes (home purchases are not included).
The personal consumer expenditures are estimated as final demand components
of the . input-output table during bench-mark years •. Estimates for quarterly
consumer spending are derived from trends shown by the Census Bureau's
retail sales figures according to kind of store, quantity series, and price
information.

Data from the Census monthly selected services receipts is

used to derive quarterly estimates of services.
Personal income measures income received by persons and includes government transfers .

It is the composite of wage and salary disbursements ,

17 .

other labor income, proprietors ' income , rental income of persons , dividends ,
personal interes-t income, and transfer payments less personal contributions
for social insurance. - Personal income less tax a-nd nontax payments yields
disposable income, where taxes are comprised of: income taxes, prelperty taxes ,
estate and gift taxes, and motor vehicle licenses .

Nontax includes passport

fees, fines, donations, penalties, and tuition and hospital fees paid to
public schools and hospitals (BEA, May 1977) .
Empirical Work
In order to establish a basic groundwork, I ran a series of regressions
1964:1-198~:2

of consUmption on disposable income using quarterly data:
a.

Ct= -19.2351 +
( 6.08)

. 9287DIt+ ~ where

( . 01)

Ct

= consumer

•

expenditures

R2 = . 9956
D-W = .7101
Secondly, a regression was run based on Brown ' s model :

My results were as follows without having adj usted for mul ticollinearity :
b.

Ct

= 1.0550
( 4.45)

+ . 1963DIt + . 7886C t _l + Ut
(.07)

(.08)

R2 = . 9981
D-W
1.35

=

A past estimate of-this function by Hendry ( 1973 ) using quarterly data
1957: 1 - 1967:2 yielded fairly similar !:esults :
Ct

= 0 . 130Dlt + O.777Ct_l + seasonals.
(.068)
(.099)

Brown ' S consumption function for non-durables and

se~vices

has been esti-

mated in the context of a n eight-equation macro-model by two stage least
squares.

The equation was estimated with quarterly dummy y ariables to ad-

just for a seasonally shifting intercept term._ At this point it is necessary
to point out that for the purposes of the study , I am interested in capturing
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the spending response to a tax policy announcement by modeling a basic
consumption function which is consistent with the PIH.
estimation of the

fun~ion

Perfecting the

itself , using a fully specified macro-model , is

not the intent of this study.
A brief interpretation of the results of t he first two regressions
will provide a foundation for our complete consumption-tax change model .
First, our model '""a".is the simplest form of the consumption function .

The

coefficient of the disposable income variable, the MPC, was estimated to be
. 93.

In this stringently specified equation, any omitted variables, posi-

tively correlated with disposable income , tend

to push the parameter

estimate higher than the true value.
Model "b" included lagged consumption as an explanatory variable .
This term allows for current consumption to be closely dependent upon its
own recent behavior as well as on income.

Thus, the coefficient of dis-

posable income must be interpreted differently for this model.

The DI

estimate in this model is clearly not a measure of the MPC out of income,
but is

a :~easure

of the change in consumption associated with a one unit

change in disposable income, assuming "that consumption in the previous
period remained . unchanged (pindyck/Rubinfeld 1981)." More importantly,
the main distinction of

model "b" , is that the total effect of a change

in disposable income on consumption will take place over time and can be
measured only by calculating the long-run MPC, assuming that consumption
patterns are equal over time.
In the estimated equation :

Solving for Ct

MPCLR

=

= Ct - l ,

.1963/(1-.78~6)

the MPC LR

= Bl/ (1-B2 )'

= .9286.

As a first procedure in estimating the derived equation, " I",
gate .t ax and non-tax payments in terms of levels were applied .

aggre-

Using this

variable runs the risk of misspecification, for it must be assumed that
Federal taxes have undergone changes which can be separated from state

/
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and local tax reforms.

State and local taxes as well as nontax payments

are assumed to have remained fairly constant.
the regression estimates

There is the possibility that

will capture the effects of such significant

state tax changes as the California proposition #13

on top of the effects

of specific Federally legislated tax cuts.
In this procedure, because tax levels rather than tax rates will
be applied, it will be unnecessary to take log values:

For purposes of simplification, Personal Income less Tax and non-tax payments
equals Disposable IncoJ.TIe. In estimating the .equation, dummy one values
proxied for quarters in which a tax cut was in legislation .
1964:1-1965:4 - Kennedy Tax Reform Program
1981 : 4-1983: 2 - Reagan' s Economic Recovery Act.
1. Ct

=

.3186 + . 9278C t _ l + . 0721 (PIt-Tt) +
( 5.65)
( .05)
(. 05)

~8045(Tt':"Tt_l ) Dt

+

Vt .

(.50)

Before correcting for auto correlation errors, the OLS parameter estir(lates
were considered.

It is fairly evident that the lagged consumption variable

and the disposable income variable are sensitive to multicollinearity,
because of a relatively high degl;"ee of covariance between the estimated
parameters .

The former is overestimated and the latter is underestimated

in terms of the true parameter.
Brown' s basic model is ideal for the purposes of this study

for it

accords with the PIH, where consumers are expected to adjust their spending
patterns over time: cP
adjustment of

= f(Y P ).

consump~ion

habits .

The model allows for cmntinuouspartial
By adjusting the Brown specification

in order to include the effects of changing tax rates on consumer·spending,
the regression estimates are still consistent with previous estimates of
the MPC.
Deflated disposable income replaced deflated personal income less

,
:"

..--...
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tax and nontax payments in a second estimation :
2.

Ct

=

~ 92 C _
+
t l
( . 05)

. 56 +
( 5 . 77)

.080I t +
( . 05)

.07(Tt- Tt_I)Ot + Vt •
(.16 )

All coefficients ...,ere significant at the 5% l evel, given a one tail ed
test.

The regression

results are close to expected values.

Both the lagged

consumption variable and the disposable income variable closely correspond
to regressions run by Brown et al.

The R2

=

.9980, o-w

=L

5142 indicating

a good fit at the expense of serious multicollinearity and serial correlation .
The fact that estimates using the original (PIt-T t ) variable and the tax
cut variable are highly correlated is evident by the substantial reduction
in the upward bias of the tax cut parameter when the OI t variable was substituted.

The regres sions

have ." _be~m

of a tax rate change on consumption.

ineffective in capturing the effect
By using tax levels, the only lesson

which can be drawn is that increments in the dollar amounts of tax and nontax
p3yITlents rose wit h consumer spending DBecause taxes are a component of
disposable income , the tax variable is taking on some of the impact of
01 on consumption .

The

~eve1'

regression estimates, however, were able to

provide me with a sense cif the size of the short run and long run MPC,
Before testing the efficacy of including additional explanatory ' variables
in the estimating equation I will comment on the pure consumption dependent
variable and the consumer expenditures variable.

The MPCs which have been

estimated include investment spending on durab1es , and thus may overstate the
so called 'pure' consumption effect.

Separate regressions were run using

ser vices and non-durable goods expenditures as the dependent variable .
results are summarized below:
I)
"II )

III )

Ct = 14.7478 + .75590It + Ut
( .01)
(5.97)
Ct = 5.2147 + . 0446 OI t + .9419C t _ l + u t
(2.03 )
( .03 )
( .04)
Ct '" 4.9342 + • 0435 DI t + . 9437 Ct-l + . 2909 (Tt-Tt-l)DUMt + Ut
( 2 . 04 )
( .03 )
( .04 )
( .24)

The
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We may compare the

~WC

estimated from using a 'pure ' consumption de-

pendent variable and a consumer expenditure dependent variable.
diture regression yielded a high

~Cl.r.

of . 9286.

Our expen-

Filtered estimates of

consumption which defines durables to be a component of savings, yields
a

~Cl.r.

of .1676.

This results comes close to estimates by Friedman and

other economists who were testing the pure PIH.

Davis(1952) used constant

annual data for the period, 1929-1940 and estimated MPC to equal . 7886.
Simultaneous equation bias results when OLS is applied to our structural equation.

This is mainly due to variables, N~~ely disposable income

and taxes, which are not exogenous.

DI is jointly determined in the equation

system and is thus related to the error term in the consumption function .
Corrections for simultaneous equation bias using instrumental variables
yi~lds

a slightly lower

~C

of .68 • . The long run

The addition of a lagged consumptiGn
a

~C

value of . 8021 in the long run.

~C

seems more reasonable.

variable, less durables predicts
MPCl.r .

=

.0446/(1-.9419).

Although

we observe estimates which may be biased, we can consistently conclude that
our consumption function obeys the Keynesian l aw that the short-run MPC,
Bl , is less than the long-run MPC, Bl/ (l-B2 ) •
My next procedure was to attempt to improve upon the fundamental consumption function.
specification.
balance effect .
time.

Wealth is a possible determinant in Keynes' original

By including a wealth variable, we are incorporating a real
Its role is to counterbalance changing income streams over

Imbalances in

a

consumer ' s asset position is allowed to affect her

consumption behavior.
The dependence of consumption on two components of disposable income:
transfer payments and all other disposable income will be identified.
Changes in the level of income as in our original model will affect consumption slowly, so the dependence occurs through a geometric lag.

The
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Ct value will also impose a ge ometric lag on wealth.

Because we expect

the increases or decreases in wealth to affect Ct , we use the change in the
wealth levels as an estimating variable.

The reason for separating the DI

variable into two components is to stabilize the estimating equation.

Accor-

ding to Wallis, an equation results in an instability when there ' is a heavy
dependence on disposable income.

Dividing the variable into two ccmponents

reduces this instability.

Using total consumer spending asa dependent variable produced the fol10wing
results, where DI was disaggrega t ed into transfers, TR, and non-transfers .
T-statistics are in parenthesis:
Ct

= 25 . 1872

R2

= . 9983

( 2.042)

D-W

+ . 3207TRt+ .1248(DI-TR)t+ . 8658(Tt-Tt_l)DUHt+ ~8062Ct_l + Vt
( 3.640 )
(1.583 )
(1.849)
(10.613)

= 1.3773

We would expect the MPC for transfers to be lower than the MPC for
othe r income because lower inccrn e households tend to consume out of transfers.

Over a cross section of the population, the average and marginal

propensities to consume fall

as income rises. This is a well-accepted

corollary to Keyne s' fundamental law: the proportion of income consumer decre ases as income increases .

As the regression estimates indicate, the

MPC out of transfer payments is indeed as tbeory suggests, where: b 2

~

bl

The inclusion of the change in household wealth variable yielded disappointing results.

Data was obtained from the F loor of Funds Division -

The Federal Reserve Board.
Ct

= 9 . 0552

R2

= . 9984

(. 738)

+ . 8339 C t _ l + .2650 TR + .1380 (DIt-TRt ) + • 9750 (Tt';"'ft-l )

D-W == 1. 2849

(11.746)

(3.181)

(1.883)

(2.236)

+ .00624WLTH + Vt .
( . 806 )
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Although the wealth variable itself leads to a higher R2, we are unable
to accept this variable as having any significant explanatory power.
Comparable · results with or without the Asset variable indicated that
"

WLTH '''~ could

not improve the estimating equation.

Disposable Income was further disaggregated in.order to test the
independent effects of property income, transfers, and all other income.
Separating for wage income would not be beneficial for the interest of
this study, for consumers are usually unable to seaparate windfall gains or
withholding reductions from other increases in their salary.
An experimental variable "consumer sentiment" was included to
measure the consumer's expectation effect.

For instance a high consumer

sentiment index value corresponds to quarters in which a permanent tax cut
was implemented, indicating that consumers should have faith in the permanence
of the tax cut.
~,eir

As a result,

disposable income.

they would be more likely to consume out of

The causality could also be reversed.

An announeed

tax cut, itself could boost consumer confidence and their perception of the
health of the economy .

Indeed, this was true of the 1964 Kennedy Tax Cut.

The C.S. Index was at its peak through the years 1964-1966.

The index was

low through the early eighties, only having jumped within the first three
quarters of 1983 frow a level of 75.3 to 91 . 6 •
Ct

= -20.0821
(-1.321 )
R2
D-W

+ . 7654C t _l + .31l7TRt + . 300lPRt +
(14 . 06)

(4 . 29)

(4.25)

.1909~ OTHERT+

(2.96 )

1.2172 CUTt + V
t
(3.05)

= . 9988
=

1.7878

All statistics are significant at the 5% level .
and property income 'seem' reasonable .

Th e coefficients for transfers

Further disaggregation of disposable

income introduced serious problems of multicollinearity.

Because there is a

positive correlation between different income variables, OLS cannot sort out
the independent effects of a particular type of income .

There is little ex-
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planatory value left in each coefficient and the system collapses .

Thus ,

although the standard errors of the estimators are low, the value of the
parameters may not have an interpretable value .
The tax cut coefficient was biased upward due to collinearity with
elements of property income.

The tax level variable was again unable to

proxy for the announcement effect on consumer spending.
that taxes roseconcomit·antly

We can only observe

with consumption from quarter to quarter.

The addition of a proxy for consumer sentiment yields an estimating
equation which has a more random distribution of the error term.

Serial

correlation is substantially reduced.
Ct - - 46 . 5275 + . 8127 Ct-l + . 2 968 TR t + .1339 PR t + .1793 O'rHERt
(1 5.562)
(4.399)
(1 . 661)
(2.988 )
( -2 . 916 )

+ .7993 CUT t + .3190 CSt + Vt.
(2 . 055 )

2

(3.541 )

= .999
D-W = 2 .100
R

It has been noted that the results from t he ' level ' · regressions combined both automatic stabilization effects, as well as the effects of
discretionary fiscal policy changes .

We now must attempt to separate

a

tax cut effect from other income disturbances .
T

AT

= fer * DI)
= or .. DI ..... Ai)l *

r

If the income effect of taxation overwhelms the tax rate effect, the
result of a tax cut policy on consumer spending will be masked.
A separate t e st .was deve loped to help capture the result of an
announced permanent tax cut.

Earlier, we observed from the model of

Consumption regressed on lagged cons umption, disposable income, and the
change in tax levels from the preceding period, that taxes and consumption

25.

rise together even in th ose quarters where a permanent tax change was enacted .
Thus ~

it seems that a positive $1 increment in tax levels leads t o nearly a

$1 increase in consumer spending.

Moreover, because disposable income is

included as an explanatory variable, tax levels are already built into the
model.

It is difficult to capture the separate effects of a tax cut.

As a result of our findings, our question at this point is whether a
tax cut has an effect on consumption, independent of its effect through
disposable income.

According to the PIH, it should not, for income changes

affect permanent income, which in turn, through a lagged effect feeds into
consumption.
Very simply, we may t est the assumption t hat the slope parameter of
the consumption function h as changed in periods when a tax cut is announced.
I n other words , we should test whether an announced tax policy can bring
about a change in the aggregate MPC.

A test of whether this change is sig-

nificant is given by testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient,
DDMtDlt

= O.

Least-squares estimation should yield unique estimates of the standard
errors and of the distributions of the estimated parameters.

As in Fried-

man's PIB model, the variance of the error term is assumed to be the same
in periods when

eith~a

temporary tax cut or no

cut has been announced

in contrast to those periods in which a permanent tax cut is announced.
Quarters tested were :
Ct

= -31.23

R2

=

1964:1-1965:4, 1981:4

+ . 94Dl t - .06 DUMtDl t + 44 . 36DUMt +u t
(4.402 )
(116.38)
(-2.576)
( 2.8~,Z)

. 9961

The pure announcement effect of a permanent tax cut; 1964:1 and 1981:4 was
tested as well :

Ct

= -22.43

+ .93 DI t ( -3.650)
(129.7)

.06DUMtDIt + 44.96 DUMt + Ut
(-2.021)
(1.930)
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We can conclude the following about whether consumption behavior differs
as a result of announced reductions in taxation.
announcement of a permanent

~cut

A test of whether an

will induce a change in the aggregate

MPC is provided by testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient DtDIt
equals zero.

We accept the null hypothesis in this case.

we reach is consistent with economic theory.

The conclusion

Namely, a tax cut gain will

not show up as a deviation in the consumers' long-run consumption plans,
An announcement of a permanent tax cut may have the effect of shifting the
consumption function, as any increase in permanent income would, but it should
have no effect on altering the slope of the function.

In other words,

the announcement did seem to correspond with a higher consumption level than
in those years when a well-publicised tax change was not legislated:

the

intercept of the consumption function changed in permanent tax cut quarters .
This change was significant given the highly significant Dummy variable
estimate.
We may conclude thct: in those two quarters when a permanent tax cut was
announced, the differences in MPC were slight.
is .06 at the 5% level of significance.
two quarters: 1964:2-1981:4.

The dummy-DI coefficient

The same regression was run on the

Insignificant t-ratios led me to conclude that

the time of announcement is crucial.

Consumers were perhaps already well-

aware of the tax change prior to t.tar·ch of 1964 , when the change
mented.

\-las

imple-

The announcement took place throughout the early months of 1 964 .

By 1 964:2, the announcement effect had a less profound effect.
On the other hand, Reagan's tax reform was 'announced' relatively
early in 1981, but was not wholly implemented until the last quarter of 1 981The 1981 individual income taxes had in fact increased 14.6% from the previous year.

By 1982 , the rate of increase had been reduced to 3 . 96% from

the preceding year .

.'
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A l agged consumption variable is formulated into the equation:

Bl t ests the long run effect of lagged consumption on consumption this quarte~
We should expect B2 to be close to zero, whereas Bl, the long run MPC with
no tax change, should be around .8 .
.71 , B2

=

.22 and DI

significant .

=

.2 •

What we in fact find is that Bl equals

.The remaining variables were statistically in-

Since Bl equals long runMPC, whereas B2 equals the effect of

a permanent tax cut on long run MPC , the sum of Bl + B2 yields the total
MPC 1 • r.

!;:

•

93 •

We are now ready to test the initial estimating equation: "I" , by
applying tax rates.

For the 1964 and 1981 permanent tax cut periods, the

major part of the tax cut program was in reducing the withholding rate.
Legislators of these two cuts were primarily interested in cutting taxes
"on the margin" .

=T

The approximations for the tax rates : r
collections is divided by national income .

/ NI, where total tax

Returning to our earlier esti-

mating equation:

Using tax rates within the estimating equation did not lead to significant
results upon first estimation.
nificant.

More

in~eresting

The tax cut parameter waS small and insig-

was the negative sign of the tax cut estimator.

As expected, a d e cline in tax rates from the preceding quarter will lead to an
increase in consumer spending .

Two-stage least squares was then applied to

correct for nMiL!::8dlinearit:y.

1964:1-1965:4 and 1981 : 4-1983:2 respresented

the quarters in which a permanent tax cut was enacted-.

Prior to adjusting

for multicollinearity, the estimating equation was as follows:
In C

R2

t

= .01

+ . 78 In Ct - l + .21 In DI t (.289 )
(10. 35 )
( 2 . 72)

= . 9984

D-W

.27ARATEtDUMt
(-.42)

= 1.4312

+

V t'
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The Instrumental variables used in re-estimating the equation were : the constant,
deflated Gross Private Domestic Investment, deflated Government Expenditure ,
lagged disposable income, and the dummy variable:
In Ct

=

.03 + .91 I n Ct-l + .08 In Dlt - 4.94 ARATEtDUM t + Vt •
(.126) (1.360)
(1.119)
(-1.067)
D-W

= 1. 9629

A plot of the variance-covariance matrix revealed a random distribution of
the error terms.

Omitted variable misspecification, hO\vever, has induced an

overestimation of the parameter coefficients .
variable.

This is true of the tax cut

Although this variable and the lagged consumption variable were

both acceptable at the 10% significance level, given a one-tailed test , the
tax cut parameter deserves scrutiny.
Because, we are te s ting the change in tax rates , firs -t differencing
from preceding quarters, the greater than one coefficient could reflect
accumulatory effects from consumer expectations from past

~jods .

The crucial

outcome of the equation is the direction .

A reduction in the tax rate will

lead · to an increase in consumer spending.

The value of the estimator itself

is not meaningful due to misspecification .
Although the variable proxying

individual tax payments did not ex-

h ibit variability from quarter to quarter, due to non-tax payments, I performed the same regression as in my former model using yearly individual
Federal income tax payments.

In this manner I could draw out the spec ific

federal tax changes, rather than measure both federal- 'announced' tax changes
as vlell as state and local tax changes.

The parameter results were not as

easily interpreted as my quarterly time-series results.
the substantially reduced degrees of freedom.

This maybe due to

It wasrnore difficult to

accept the tax cut parameter estimates at the 1 0% confidence level .
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Examining the yearly Individual Income Tax data itself is beneficial in
identifying the changes in tax levels feom year to year.
sitive increment occurred in the 1964-5 tax cut years .

The lowest poTotal individual

tax collections in current dollars was increased by .1 billion.

The 1968

surtax raised the level of tax collections up by 18.5 billion in the years
1967- 8.

Tax collections were actually reduced in 1971 by 4.2 billion from

the previous year .

The 1 975 rebate and tax cut program witnessed only a

3.46 increment in tax collection from the preceding year.

Tax collection

growth was greatest in 1981 when taxes increased 41.8 billion, a 15% growth
rate.

By 1982, under Reagan's Tax Reform Act, tax rates had dropped to a 4%

growth rate from the previous year .
The 1964 tax cut corresponded to a 13% growth in consumer spending from
1964 to 1966., and a 14% growth rate in personal disposable income within
these two years .

This may be compared to the 1976-76 tax cut program, which

corresponded to a 10% growth in consumer spending and an 8% growth in disposable income .
Where 1981, 1975, 1970 and 1965 are proxied as tax cut years:

=

.03 + . 07 in C _ + . 76 In DI t + .99 CUT.t + V
t 1
t
(.42 ) (1.63)
( 5.28)
(1.36)

.998.
1.14

When temporary tax-cuts were combined with Permanent cuts the estimator
has a positive correlation with consumer spending.

A differenT story

emerged when results were run using the two permanent tax cut
and 1981.

yea~s,

1964

The sign 'of the tax cut estimator became negative, indicating

that in those two years, a reduction in tax rates induced an increase in
consumer spending.

Without further corrections for multicollinearity ,

the results were not acceptable at the 10% significance level :
Ct

= .03
(.39)

+ .29 In Ct _ l + .70 In DI - .5lCUTt + Vt
t
(1.87)

(4.47)

(-1 . 32)

R2 = .998
D-W = 1. 20
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Instrumental variable estimation was able to give more robustestimates .

The lagged consumption parameter, for example, was equal to . 85,

a much more plausible e stimat2than the unadjusted estimate of .29 •
Ct

=

. 19 + . 85 In Ct _ l + .12 In DIt - 1.41 CUTt + Vt '
(1. 42 ) ( 2 . 19)
(1 .31)
(-1.43)

R2
D-W

= .9962
= 1.45

Our tax cut parameter should really be measuring changes, not from the
preceding quarter, but in relation to the quarter immeidiately prior to
the tax change.

Our permanent tax cut: B(rt - rt_l)DUMt should be specified:

B{rt - r*)DUM , where r* is proxied by the maximum tax rate up to the pret
sent period.

For example in 1965:3 we should expect B to measure the diffe-

rence in tax rates from 1963:4-1965:3 .

Tax rates peaked a few quarters before

the Kennedy program was implemented.
As a test, I have cut t he extent of the 1964 Kennedy Revenue Act to four
quarters , beginning in the f irst quarter of 1964 ( in March) the program
effective ly lasted through the fi r st half of 1965 .

However, the tax reduc-

tion scheme took a downturn at the close of 1964, and it is accurate to say
that the tax reform program had substantial reductions in 1965.

Heller found

that during the first half of 1965, the administration had to allow for
reduced refunds and large ' clean-up payments ' on the 1964 liabilities ,
reducing the magnitUde of the tax cut (1968) .
Thus, the measur ement for the tax cut parameter could be specified
as (Tt-T*)DUMt where T*
tax reform program.

= 60.9

billion in the quarter preceding the 1964

Unfortunately, regressions run for a ten year period

from 1964-1974 showed i nsignificant results in testing the difference between
quarter "x" and the quarter immediately preceding the tax cut.
vie'" tax cuts as a marginal, incremental process.

Consumers

They may be unable to

distinguish year to year tax changes, let alone compare this quarter ' stax
change to a change in tax rates a couple years earlier .
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Not surprisingly, the most sucessful way in which to capture the tax
cut's impact on consumer spending does take into account that consumers do
not respond to a tax cut immediately, or in the very same quarter the tax
cut is implemented.

Such a view would be unrealistic.

Pechman (1977, p. 20)

when describing a consumer's response to temporary income tax changes, notes
that " most economists believe that a temporary income tax change would have
some effect on consumer spending, although they agree that it would be less
powerful than a permanent tax change."

"Income tax changes," he emphasizes,

"also operate with a lag, because consumers do not alter their spending immediately in response to changes in disposable income ."
Rather than first differencing the rate of tax change, comparing the
present quarters' tax rates with last quarters ' rate.s, the tax rate corresponding to year t , should be specified as:

RATEt_l - RATE t _2.

this period react to last period's change in tax rates.

Consumers

An announcement will

not induce consumers to spend out of any increased incomes until at least two
quarters after the tax cut has been realized by the public .
Regressions will continue to be run using the BEA's "tax and nontax
payments" data, instead of data which separates government revenue collections
into a component, "Individual Income Taxes". The BEA quarterly data is reliabl!e
and consistent.

Furthermore, we may be assured that non-tax payments comprises

less than 2% of the Personal Tax and Non-tax payments data points.

A series of

calculations indicated that there is little variance in this component from
quarter to quarter.
Tests of the permanent tax change periods 1964:1 - 1965 : 4 and 1981:41982:2 were run. The tax cut variable was specified as follows:
RATE

= TAX

CUT t

= RATEt_l

PAYMENTS/NATIONAL INCOME (NI)
- RATE t _2
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A comparison of the regressions results using tax cut proxies measures
as: a } RATE - RATE _ and b) RATE t _ l - RATEt_2
t l
a) In Ct

b) In Ct

is given below:

=

.008 + .781 In Ct _ l + .216 In DI t _ l (2.772 )
(.201)
(l0.313)

=

. 004 + .782 In Ct _ l + .215 In Dl t
(.103 ) (10.650)
(2.847)

.480 CUT t + Vt
(-.809)

1.290 CUTt + Vt
(-2.241)

R2
D-W
R2
D-W

= .9984
= 1.4642
= .9985
= 1.3810

The highly significant tax cut coefficient of 1.29 leads us to confirm that
a permanent tax cut announcement has a negative effect on a cansurner'scalculation of his/her permanent disposable income.
induces consumers to spend .

A decline in the tax rate

For each 1.0 standard deviation reduction in

the tax rate, there is a corresponding 1.29 standard deviation increase in
consumption.

The reason for the greater than one coefficient could be due

to the following reasons: 1) accumulatory expectation effects which arise
from consumers'responding after a -' lag, 2) serial correlation of the first order
may be present, affecting the efficiency of the estimator, 3) specification
error due to an omitted variable, which is positively correlated and thus
upwardly biases the tax cut estimator.
Consumers do not ignore the legislated cuts. We can reject the null
hypothesi's B

=0

with confidence.

A permanent tax cut is treated , just as

any other change in one's permanent income would be treated by consumers.
In order to take consumer's expectations into account, an index for consumer
sentiment is included into the estimating equation.

The Index is collated by

the University of M,ichigan' s, Survey Research Center ,~nd is based on quarterly personal and telephone interviews.

The sample size of 1,200 - 2,000

respondents is selected by multi-stage area probability sampling methods.
The respondent is asked five questions based on cemparing his personal financial status today with his status a year ago, speculating on _his financial
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status a year from today, and five years from today; and on consumers '
opinions of whether it is a good or a bad time to buy major household items .
A formula is then applied which subtracts a proportion of down or negative
responses with a proportion of up or positive responses.

These answers are

then averaged and converted into an index (Handbook of Cyclical Indicators ,
p. 31) .
After the inclusion of the CS variable there was a noticable reduction
in serial correlation.

A plot of the regression showed a random distri-

bution of the error terms,

= -.261

In Ct

R2

+ . 735 In Ct-l + .294 In DI t (-5.765 ) ( 13 . 187)
(5.065)

= . 9992

D-W

. 870 CUTt + ~OOI CSt + Vt •
(-1 . 985 )
(7.556)

= 2 . 0569

As my next procedure, disposable income is disaggregated into transfers
and nontransfer income:

= .233

In C t
H2

+ . 868 In C _ + .069 In (DIt-TR t ) + .027 In TRt - 1.316CUTt + Vt
t l
(1. 805 ) ( 12.497)
(1.074)
(2.449)
(-2.233 )

= , 9985

D-W

=

.15028

The final estimating equation is specified to include 'Consumer Sentiment'.
In Ct

R2
D-W

=

.001 + .807 In Ct_l + . 160 In(DIt-TRt) + . 0401n TRt (.005) (15.294 )
(2.827)
(4.653)

= . 9992

= 2.1517

. 926 CUTt
(-2.079)

+.001 CSt + Vt
(7.588)

In this final equation, all estimates are significant at the 5% significance
level .

The highly significant permanent tax cut coefficient comes very close

to -1 0, the full effect, whereby consumers integrate a tax cut into their
0

spending decisions as they would any other change in their permanent income .
Our tax proxy (RATEt_l - RATE t _2> indicates that the tax cut was able to
induce consumers to spend, only a couple quarters after the tax cut was implemented.

We may say that there is a short lag between the time a cut is

implemented, and the quarter i n which consumers respond to the tax cut .
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The purists of the PIH, consider durables to be part of savings and
investment c

Thus, if a conSumer spends a portion of his tax cut dollars

on consumer durables, that component is not considered to be part of pure
consumption, Ct":*
It is not surprising that filtering the dependent variable of durables
reduces the size of the coefficient estimates, particularly the tax cut
variable.

Out of the original estimator, -.90 , the proportion spent on

services and nondurables declines to a value of -.69.
In Ct *

= .-.081

+ .938 In C*t-l + .069 In DIt (-3 . 029 ) ( 30.329)
(2.288)

R2 = . 9996

D-I'17

.692 CUTt + .001 CSt + V .
t
(-2 . 393)(6.130)

= 1. 7376

Disaggregating Disposable Income:

=

.026 + .957 In C*t_l + . 026 In (DIt-TR t ) + .013 In TR
t
(.42 )
( 34 . 956 )
(. 945 )
(2.485)
R2 = . 9996
- . 682 CUTt + . 001 CSt
D-W = 1.8184
(-2.354)
(6.258)
In Ct*

We may conclude, given the pure PIH, that consumers were not completely
responsive to an announced permanent tax cut.

Definitionally consumers may

not have been convinced that the tax would last, thus spending part of the
income on "durables" which is considered to be a temporary or windfall spending effect.
Whe ther a temporary tax cut is as effective needs to be addressed .
We need to test whether all tax cuts, regardless of their temporal nature,
significantly affect consumer spending.

The PIH on wlich the estimating

equation is derived would stipulate that "temporary income tax changes should
have little impact on consumer spending in principle (Blinder, 1981, p. 27) ."
Friedman's PIH (1957) establishes that a) transitory components have zero
means b) the covariances between permanent and temporary components are zero,
and c) the transitory components of income and consumption are uncorrelated
with eac h other .

From these assumptions we should expect that a windfall
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gain will be saved (not ' spenton non-durable goods).
E(CT,Y T )

= 0,

In other words, given

a positive temporary income value should not lead to any de-

viation from one's consumption pattern.
There have been four major, well-publiciSed tax changes during the years
1960s- 1980s.

The 1964 and 1981 cuts' ih marginal tax rates were publically

announced as permanent.

The 1968 income tax surcharge was introduced in the

third quarter and was clearly temporary in nature. A rebate and massive
tax cut were enacted in the second quarter of 1975.

The rebate was clearly

temporary, and the remainder has been debated.
1964:2-1965:4
1968:3-1970:2
1975:2-1976:2
1981:3-present

Dummy variables were used
to correspond to all tax cut
quarters.

The resultant regressions estimates reveal interesting outcomes,
which are nevertheless consistent with the PIH framework.
both temporary and permanent tax changes,

I

By combining

find that the results of consumer

spending to tax cuts as a whole, are insignificant.

A tax cut 'temporary'

in nature does not alter cOnsumer spending patterns .
Regressions which included these temporary tax cuts failed to give
significant t'statistics.

Moreover, the coefficients dropped to

~.10.

Then the temporary tax cuts alone, were tested, there was even less of a
consumption response.

Any tax cut induced response was either absorbed in

savings as the PIH predicts, or was spent more .than a year after the legislation of the temporary cut. B values are as follows (t-statistics are in
parenthesis) :
Permanent
-.926
(-2'079)

Permanent & Transitory
-.111
(-.778)

Transitory
-.024
(-.156)

Note that the inclusion of temporary 'tax cut ' yields a greatly reduced
tax cut coefficient .

Although the result is not highly significant, we

can hazard a guess that in those quarters , a tax cut was wholly ignored .
The effect of income rising concomitantly with tax changes overpowered the
induced censumer spending effect.
The 1975 temporary tax cut coincided with the PIH model which states
that a temporary or transitory change in income will have its main impact
on saving and investment type assets, and not on consumption.
tax cut will not increase permanent expected income.

A temporary

Consumption should

proceed in the same path as if there had not been a tax change.
that the 1975 tax cut actually induced savings.

We find

The data confirms this.

In 1968, saving fell from 7.5% in the quarter immeidiately preceding the
1968:2 surcharge to 5.6%. Consumers spent despite .the surcharge.

By 1975:2

when a tax cut was implemented, the savings rate shot up from 6.4% to 9.7%
in 1975:2.
consumption.

It is evident that the tax cut induced savings rather than
Blinder's study of the 1975 tax cut confirms the latent nature

of the spending effect.

When the direct effects of the tax cut on consumer

spending were estimated, he found that most of the spending out of the tax
cut were done in 1976 and 1977 .
the last two quarters of 1977.

The greatest spending effect occurring in
Moreover, it is glaringly evident

hGW

small

the tax cut impacts were relative to the size of the economy they were meant
to stimultate (Blinder, 1981:46 ).
Theoretically, consumption is not affected by transitory changes in
income, yet, it is possible that unexpected windfalls could be used in spending ,
by inducing sOmeone to splurge, or what Friedman call_s, "riotous living" .
A definition of consumption in terms of purchases in durables as well as nondurables is making allowances in the theoretica l definition of consumption.
Even when a broader definition of consumption to include durables .was

~pplied

the transitory tax cuts tested were insignificant in boosting consumption.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR FISCAL POLICY

The choice between utilizing either expenditures or tax rate changes
for stabilization purposes is dependent on the policy needs at hand.

Go-

vernment spending has been useful in determining long-run national need$,
whereas tax changes may be more appropriate for stabilizing the economy when
short-run cyclical considerations areat stake.
As the results from this study have confirmed, tax rate changes have
accelerated consumer spending without changing the consumers' marginal propensity to consume.

Nost tax cuts take the form of the withholding system

for wages and salaries.

Moreover, the effect of tax cuts on a wage earner ' s

take-home pay is difficult, if not impossible to differentiate from other
changes in income .
The real power of a tax cut program is achieved through what Pechman
calls the 'perverse short run effect' (1977).

Generally speaking, a tax rate

cut will leave consumers with larger after-tax incomes, thereby leading to
direct increases in consumer demandor consumer spending .
demand will spur on consumer goods production.

The increase in

Increased production leads

to further consumer spending, generating additional inertia to production
and income .

Thus, through the multiplier effect, GNP is increased by an

amount exceeding the original tax cut dollars.

Heller estimates that the

dollar amount of withheld taxes during 1964 was half of the resultant consumption .gain through the multiplier process. He calculated that an approximation of the consU!Uption multiplier for a tax cut is "close to two"
( 1968, p. 41) .

It would be misleading to criticize tax cut programs as being too
insubstantial to have a significant stabilization effect.

The naive in-

ter pretation of the effectiveness of a tax cut ignores the multiplier effect .
After averaging the tax cut to dollars per tax rate, the total dollar effect
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may be less than $5 a week per tax payer .
at leas t 1 - 2% of GNP.

This number in terms of GNP is

The resulting stimulus to the economy can be

powerful, g'iven the multiplier effect.
As demonstrated through regression analysis , treating temporary tax
cuts . (i. e.

1970~ 71

and 1975) as permanent yieldsinsignif icant results.

Temporary tax cuts alter

n~atherthe

shape of the consumption function,

nor t he level of consumer spending in the short .run.

According to the

PIH , temporary tax cuts become a component of the error term (Wallis, 19if3 ).
The difficulty of obtaining robust estimates of the tax cut proxy had
been experienced by past researchers on the issue of Government Tax Cut
or Surcharge Programs (Blinder 1981, Juster, . 1977).

In an aggregate study, only

tentative conclusions can be mad e about individual behavior.

The sum total

effect of individual spending r e veals that an announcement raises the level of
consumer spending, although the MPC clearly stays fixed.
vation, we may extrapolate further:

From this obser-

tax cuts of a permanent nature are

treated as any other income disturbance .

Out of the expanding income pie,

the same marginal propensity to consume is applied.
By pure definition consumers allocate income gains between consumption
and savings.

Both on the average and on the margin, it would be fair .t o say

that the majority of disposable income is consumed.

If a tax-cut gain of a

permanent nature is treated no differently than other increases 'in income, we
would expect most of it to be consumed.

The premise of the· PIH derived

model, is that tax-cut dollars are treated
income .

like ~ other

dollars of additional

Our results have yielded consumption-income relationships in which

the MPC is close to average values found in other recent consumption studies .
-Besides raising consumer spending, a tax cut "announcement" could
raise consumer expectations and consumer confidence.

Our high tax cut

coefficient value could reflect the affect of induced confidence in t he economy -
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Policy makers are often wary ' of implementing a permanent tax cut if there
i s a reasonabl e chance that full emploY>m'ltt ,· can be reached through automatic
stabilization alone.

In 1 964, He ller persuaded Kennedy, Johnson, and Congress

that the full-employment surplus was dragging the economy down.
20 % personal tax cut aided the ailing economy .

The ensuing

Due to the timing bf the

tax cut .. program, inflation was held off until the Vietnam War • ••• two years
later (Baily, 1982 ).
According to Eckstein (1 979 ), during the great recession in 1974-5, double
digit inflation was occurring whereas consumer spending had fallen 2.3% iIi 1974 .
At first , it was believed that taxes should be increased to cut back on inflatio n.

However, once economic decline was evident, Congress enacted dis-

cretionary tax cuts.

As a result, consumer confidence returned.

Whether the success of Kennedy's 1964 tax cut program can be applied
·~o

today' s economy is an impor tant issue.

Kemp-Roth advocates should not

ignore the context undZ:'! r which Kennedy was able to carry out a successful
anti-recession campaign.

There were conditions within the 1960s economy

conducive towards recovery which are lacking in the 1980s.

Inflation was

only 1.2%/year and unemployment around 5.6% at a time when the full employIa8l1t target was 4% (Baily/Okun, 1982: 87) .

Heller commented that in

1960s, the economy hSld both price stability and excess capacity.

the

Because

there was already a 30-3~ billion supply capacity in the economy, a tax cut
could release purchasing power to individuals in order to absorb that supply
capacity .
Th e major objective of the 1964 tax cut was demand oriented.

The

implications 'of a tax cut in the Kennedy Administration was to increase
aggregate demand accross the board to absorb a pre-existing .supply capacity .
Kemp-Rothers on the other hand, sppport

tax cuts from the ' supply-side·.

Secretary of the Treasury , Donald Regan emphasized that the incentive tax

/
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policy program must "reduce the tax barriers to work, savings, and investment.

Be "rejects the simplistic view that the way to get the economy moving

is by pumping up consumption and by fine-tuning demand in the short run
(Hearings, 1981)."

In a statement before the Committee of Ways and Means ,

he summarized that the intent of the President t s tax proposals

w·~S

to expand

incentives and opportunities for socially productive efforts and savings for
all tax payers .

Tax reductions would "contribute to substantial increases

in savings and investment".

He compared the methodology of the Kennedy

Program to the Reagan Tax Reform

Act~

"Our individual tax cut proposals call

for the same sort of tax reductions for individuals that were enacted in
1964 .

The Kennedy-Johnson cuts, like ours,focused on reducing marginal

tax rates .

Those cuts were give in two steps while ours call for cuts in

each of 3 years (1981: 7) • "
According to Heller , (1982 ) "for Kemp-Roth advocates to cite the 1964
cut as a pure illustration of how a huge tax cut causes a surge in the
supply capability of the economy is to misread facts (Okun/1982 :7).
Since the 192 Os , Congress could afford to continue in a pattern of
tax cuts,economic expansion, and the accumulation of surpluses.

Today,

however, our present unemployment is mainly of a structural nature, so
there is not an available surplus of skilled labor.

As a result, many econ-

omists fear that a massive tax reduction in the 1980s, unaccompanied by re..,
ductions in government spending, would greatly magnify the rate of inflation.
The s tudy has given some evidence that the Reagan and Kennedy tax cut
programs had both induced consumer spending.

Whether this was the original

intent of the Reagan administration cannot hide the fact that the Reagan
Tax Cut has performed consistently with what the Permanent Income Theory
would predict.

According to economic theory, Reagan may have achieved

greater boosts to s aving,

if his tax cut had been perceived in terms of windfial1s .
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CONCLUSION

From Keynesian underpinnings , a model was constructed which was based
on the Permanent Income Hypothesis .

According to this hypothesis, consump-

tion depends on 'regular' or 'permanent' income and is not affected by temporary changes in income.

Given this hypothesis, we should find that

temporary income tax changes would have relatively little impact on consump-tion, and permanent tax cuts are treated like any other increment to permanent -income.
A test using dummy variables in those quarters where an announcement
was made confirmed that an announcement has no effect on MPC in the long
run, but may have a negative effect on the intercept.

However, when a

variable was created , attempting to capture the extra spending effect
induced from a dollar increase or decrease in taxat.i on, the results were not
wholl~r

acceptable.

Initial estimates using the tax cut proxy: (RATEt-RATEt_l )DUMT , in
order to ferret out whether certain quarters would best capture the consumers '
anticipation of a permanent tax cut were not profitable.

Through each

regres sion, the problem of collinearity between income and tax payments
masked the pure tax cut effect.

Thus, the proxy "tax cut" variable picked

up positive income-consumption ef fects .

The two quarters in which permanent

tax rate cuts were announced: 1964:1 and 1981:4, did have enough of a
cons umption induceme nt effect to dominate the income-tax cut relationship.
This was not true, however , of either the 1970, 1968 or 1975 temporary tax
cha nges~

When these quarters were included, a highly significant positive

coefficient resulted.

Why was the 1975 Tax Cut considered to be more 'tem-

porary' than the 1964 or 1 981 tax cut programs?

The issue involves the level

of c onsumer optimism and a number of other variables based on the presence
of i nflation, unemployment, or recession at the time the tax cut was carried

•
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The implications of the findings suggest that policy makers should be
aware that the efficacy of their tax policy depends in part on the temporal
nature of the tax cut,

A" permanent ' cut will induce consumers to spend as

they would from any other increment to their permanent disposable income .
Moreover, the spending response will take place with a shorter lag than
the case in which a temporary tax cut is implemented.

1.,170
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Total Consumers Expenditures

Annual Time Series Data
in Current Dollars
1964-1980
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SUMMARY OF DATA

VARIABLE
NAME

VARIABLE
MEAN

STANDARD
DEVIATION

MINIMUM

MAXIMUM

C

761 . 96

16.21

507. 5

1010. 6

DI

841. 50

17.42

563 . 5

1083.0

TR

115.51

5.05

49.0

190.9

DURB

111.42

3 . 09

63 . 2

156.5

c*

650 . 54

13 .21

453 . 4

854.1

TAX

142 . 54

4.02

RATE

.14 09

.001 8

CS

81.63

1.41

NI

996 . 95

17.45

77 .41
.1095
54.4 (1980:2)
707.04

192.08
.1578
103.2(1965:3)
1217. 52
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